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IS THERE A CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY FOR
GOVERNMENT TO ASSURE PUBLIC HEALTH?
Todd Caldis†
Public Health Law: Power, Duty, Restraint. By Lawrence O.
Gostin. University of California Press, 2001. 491 pages. $24.95
The initial chapters of this book were originally published as a
series of articles entitled “Public Health Law in a New Century” in
1
the Journal of the American Medical Association. The book, which is
addressed primarily to an audience of public health professionals
and lawyers, may be regarded as a fuller exposition of its author’s
conviction that public health law should be more than a supporting
player in public health efforts of the 21st century.
Gostin provides a complicated definition of public health law,
which amounts essentially to the study of government’s legal
powers and duties to assure conditions of population health
through the identification and prevention of risks. The book
contains some discussion of tort law and administrative law as tools
of public health law, but in accord with its definition of public
health law most of the analysis pertains to constitutional law.
Government at both the state and federal levels is shown to have
broad power to pursue programs to affect the public’s health
subject to important procedural and substantive protections for
private rights of liberty and property. Gostin also argues that the
federal government has a positive constitutional duty to promote
public health, a notion that is likely to resound with public health
† J.D. 1979, University of Minnesota; Ph.D. candidate, Health Services
Research, School of Public Health, University of Minnesota. Mr. Caldis had his
own general law practice in St. Paul for 20 years and remains a member of the
Minnesota Bar. His current reasearch is in health economics, seeking to estimate
quality-adjusted HMO cost functions, and is being conducted with the support of
the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality.
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professionals, but that is certainly beyond the boundaries of
recognized constitutional doctrine. The strengths and weaknesses
of Gostin’s constitutional approach to public health law and how
his presentation of relevant constitutional law might work for
different types of readers are the criteria on which evaluation of
this book depends.
Gostin likely regards a constitutional grounding as the most
useful foundation for considering the legal status of future
accretions to public health powers and responsibilities.
Increasingly public health scholars and practitioners are adopting
an ecological model of disease transmission which assigns especial
importance to alleged social causes of disease such as human
inequality. Since interventions to address such social risk factors
would involve redistribution of resources, it would be surprising if
these new approaches fit neatly into the traditional constitutional
order without impinging on conventional notions of government
responsibility, individual rights, and property rights. No matter
what one’s stance is toward such new directions for public health
and no matter whether one is a lawyer or a public health
professional, constitutional law is a logical starting place for
considering the legal viability of such interventions.
It is likely, however, that non-lawyer readers of this book will
take away a distorted perception of constitutional law. Gostin refers
to the place of “public health in the constitutional design” as if
public health now holds some special position when in fact it is
merely one of an infinity of objectives Congress may choose to
pursue under the aegis of its enumerated powers. An argument
from the preamble to the U.S. Constitution is likely to be especially
confusing for previously untutored readers.
Although the
preamble has never been recognized as the source of any federal
constitutional power, it is cited by Gostin as evidence of federal
general welfare powers that are then deduced to include public
health. An exaggerated estimate of where public health fits into
existing constitutional arrangements may be agreeable or flattering
to readers who work in public health, but it does not reflect
currently established law and to suggest otherwise sows potentially
dysfunctional preconceptions about the priority that may be
asserted for public health agendas.
On the other hand, the book may fix misperceptions that can
arise in legal education about the extent of government power.
For lawyers who obtained the misimpression in their law school

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol29/iss1/8

2

Caldis: Is There a Constitutional Duty for Government to Assure Public He
CALDIS FORMATTED. DOC

2002]

9/6/2002 10:12 PM

A DUTY TO ASSURE PUBLIC HEALTH?

247

courses that individual rights almost always prevail over
government policies with which they conflict, much of Gostin’s
exposition will be a salutary corrective. Even in the bad old days
when courts were striking down legislation because it conflicted
with a putatively inviolable freedom of contract and substantive due
process rights, the courts nevertheless deferred to legislative acts
genuinely addressed to public health objectives despite attendant
burdens on businesses or private individuals. What held true in the
earliest cases, such as the classic compulsory immunization case
handed down early in the twentieth century, holds true today in
cases like those that uphold compulsory HIV testing for public
workers. Coercive government efforts to address public health
problems are likely to be upheld by the courts provided that the
requirements to be enforced are not invidiously discriminatory or
do not unduly burden the enjoyment of fundamental rights.
Although the author expresses qualms about how public
health policies may impinge upon private interests (especially
rights of personal autonomy and other civil liberties), he endorses
the legitimacy of existing governmental powers to pursue public
health objectives. Any other position would appear incongruous
when juxtaposed with his claim that government may have an
affirmative constitutional duty to pursue public health, a duty
presumably prior to and more encompassing than the people’s
elected representatives have so far imagined. He anticipates public
health interventions that are still more intrusive toward individual
rights and individual behavior than those now in place and
dismisses as naïve those who tell themselves that public health and
individual rights are always mutually reinforcing objectives.
What Gostin says about the idea of positive government duties
to promote public health is contained in a few pages discussing the
“negative constitution,” the traditional proposition that that despite
broad potential powers the government has no affirmative duty to
assure for individuals the conditions of life, liberty, or property
except to the extent settled upon through democratic processes.
Although he does not explicitly advocate abandonment of the idea
of a negative constitution, he is critical of it. His essential premise
seems to be that large government institutions that already exist
have fundamentally changed the constitutional environment and
require the recognition of still broader government duties. Because
government already does a lot, it has created expectations that it is
responsible for a whole range of additional issues and situations,
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and attempts to abjure responsibility are likely to be the result of an
underlying discriminatory purpose.
One clear example is
government-funded health services for the poor that do not
include abortion services. The implication of these points is that
Gostin wants recognition of at least some positive government
duties to advance public health, though he does not make clear
how far he would like to go supplanting the principle of a negative
consititution.
Given the broad constitutional power the legislative branch
already possesses to establish public health objectives, it will be
hard for some readers to fathom how recognition of affirmative
governmental duties would genuinely expand the constitutional
power behind public health. The only apparent utility would be as
a prod to other branches of government by creating wider options
for pushing a public health agenda through the courts whenever
the legislative and executive branches of government are perceived
to be neglectful or otherwise unable to deliver results on such
priorities, a possibility that Gostin does not really discuss. And
although he acknowledges that precedent is against his views, no
mention is made of the profound shift in power away from the
democratically-elected branches of government that adopting his
views might entail or the fiscal pressures that might be unleashed if
positive duties for federal government action were generally
recognized. Federal courts have enforced affirmative duties in
extraordinary circumstances when fundamental constitutional
rights have been at risk such as in the racial desegregation cases,
and state courts on occasion will attempt to enforce affirmative
duties textually recognized in their constitutions such as the right
to an equal public education. But it appears that the kind of
doctrine advocated by Gostin would reach far beyond such
important special cases which themselves have generated enduring
controversy about alleged judicial excesses. In advancing the
position that he does, however tentatively, Gostin owed it to his
readers to sketch why he believes obviously relevant countervailing
considerations may be ignored.
A similar incompleteness characterizes Gostin’s discussion of
paternalism as a basis for public health laws. He holds, for
example, that we should not attempt to justify seatbelt and
motorcycle helmet laws out of some “strained” conception of
general public welfare; instead he urges us to recognize and accept
such laws for what they really are: paternalistic coercion of private
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individuals by government for the benefit of those same private
individuals. Such paternalism may not be problematic if it is the
outcome of a democratic political process in which elected
representatives have acted subject to constitutional protections for
individuals. But Gostin has posited the possible existence of
affirmative government duties to promote public health
independent of democratic processes, in which case the issue of
paternalistic law is likely to be more problematic. Who is to guard
paternalistic guardians who are insulated from democratic
processes?
Public Health Law: Power, Duty, Restraint conveys a distorted
picture of the constitutional dimensions of public health law to
readers not otherwise equipped with a background in
constitutional law. For those readers who do come equipped with
an appropriate background the book raises the idea of recognizing
constitutional duties to assure the conditions of public health, but
ignores important issues connected to what would be important
changes in long settled constitutional doctrine. Perhaps in
attempting to address disparate audiences the author was not able
to do full justice to either.
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